Bhutto’s Assassination: Who Gains?

by F. William Engdahl

Global Research, January 4, 2008

Assassination of prominent political leaders, presumably protected by the best security, is no easy thing. It requires agencies of professional intelligence training to insure that the job is done and that no person is caught alive who can lead to those behind. Typically, from the assassination of Archduke Francis Ferdinand in Sarajevo in July 1914 to JFK, the person pulling the trigger is just an instrument of a far deeper conspiracy. So too in the assassination on December 27th, of Pakistani former Prime Minister, Benazir Bhutto. Cui bono?.

What was behind the murder of Bhutto at the moment her PPP party appeared about to win a resounding election victory in the planned January 8 elections, thereby posing a mass-based challenge to the dictatorial rule of President Musharraf?

Musharraf’s government was indecently quick to blame “Al-Qaeda,” the dubious entity allegedly the organization of Osama bin Laden, whom Washington accused for masterminding the September 11 2001 attacks. Musharraf just days after, declared he was “sure” Al Qaeda was the author, even though, on US pressure, he has asked Scotland Yard to come and investigate. “I want to say it with certainty, that these people (Al Qaeda) martyred … Benazir Bhutto,” Musharraf said in a Jan. 3 televised address. He named Baitullah Mehsud, a militant tribal chief fighting the Pakistani Army, who has alleged ties to al-Qaeda and the Afghan Taleban. Mehsud denied the charge. Had he been behind such a dramatic event, the desired propaganda impact among militant islamists would require taking open responsibility instead.

By linking the Bhutto killing to Al Qaeda, Musharraf conveniently gains several goals. First he reinforces the myth of Al Qaeda, something very useful to Washington at this time of growing global skepticism over the real intent of its War on Terrorism, making Musharraf more valuable to Washington. Second it gives Musharraf a plausible scapegoat to blame for the convenient elimination of a serious political rival to his consolidation of one-man rule.

Arabesque: US-myndighetenes 9/11-inkompetanse leder til forfremmelser

Meget godt stykke fra Arabesque: 9/11 Truth

Cui Bono? The 9/11 Promotions

By Arabesque, December 2, 2007

The 9/11 official story is a tale of outlandish incompetence. We are led to believe that Al Qaeda successfully evaded a multi-billion dollar defense establishment, NORAD air defenses, standard FAA intercept procedures, US airbases, [1] the FBI, the CIA, the NSA, international intelligence agencies, etc. without any significant or effective resistance. While any serious investigation of the 9/11 attacks was blocked by President Bush and Dick Cheney for more than a year, [2] a theory of systematic and incredible incompetence emerged: Al Qaeda got “lucky”. Mindy Kleinberg, of the 9/11 Family Steering Committee in an opening address to the 9/11 Commission criticized this notion:

“It has been said that the intelligence agencies have to be right 100% of the time. And the terrorists only have to get lucky once. This explanation for the devastating attacks of September 11th, simple on its face, is wrong in its value, because the 9-11 terrorists were not just lucky once. They were lucky over and over again. When you have this repeated pattern of broken protocols, broken laws, broken communication, one cannot still call it luck. If at some point, we don’t look to hold the individuals accountable for not doing their jobs, properly, then how can we ever expect for terrorists to not get lucky again?”[3]

What happened to those who “failed”, and what exactly were their “failures”?

Former Senator Gary Hart observes that, “in terms of accountability, I think this is one of the great mysteries of the last three or four years. Three thousand Americans died three years ago, and no one lost his or her job over it. A president who says that he is a strong president, and those around him say he is, did not fire anyone. Either he was misled, in which case, somebody should have been fired. Or he misled us, in which case he should be fired.”[4] Senator Charles Grassley similarly noted that “I can’t think of a single person being held accountable anywhere in government for what went on and what went wrong prior to Sept. 11, it seems that nobody in government makes any mistakes anymore.”[5] According to testimony given to Congress these statements are accurate; not one single individual within the CIA, FBI, and NSA has been reprimanded, punished, or fired for the events of 9/11.[6]

(…)

Les videre her.

Who benefits from the Afghan Opium Trade?

by Michel Chossudovsky

Global Research, September 21, 2006

The United Nations has announced that opium poppy cultivation in Afghanistan has soared and is expected to increase by 59% in 2006. The production of opium is estimated to have increased by 49% in relation to 2005.

The Western media in chorus blame the Taliban and the warlords. The Bush administration is said to be committed to curbing the Afghan drug trade: “The US is the main backer of a huge drive to rid Afghanistan of opium… “

Yet in a bitter irony, US military presence has served to restore rather than eradicate the drug trade.

What the reports fail to acknowledge is that the Taliban government was instrumental in implementing a successful drug eradication program, with the support and collaboration of the UN.

Implemented in 2000-2001, the Taliban’s drug eradication program led to a 94 percent decline in opium cultivation. In 2001, according to UN figures, opium production had fallen to 185 tons. Immediately following the October 2001 US led invasion, production increased dramatically, regaining its historical levels.

The Vienna based UN Office on Drugs and Crime estimates that the 2006 harvest will be of the order of 6,100 tonnes, 33 times its production levels in 2001 under the Taliban government (3200 % increase in 5 years).

Cultivation in 2006 reached a record 165,000 hectares compared with 104,000 in 2005 and 7,606 in 2001 under the Taliban (See table below).